The collapse of manufacturing / 製造業斷鏈崩盤中

Lee Li:

全球經濟風暴對全球的破壞力在2008年就已經發酵了，但目前風暴後續的衝擊和其產生的回南效應正在持續擴大，尤其對製造業的衝擊和破壞愈來愈沈重，"產銷存"之斷鏈和大失調持續在打破歷史紀錄，現在各國政府被逼出手拯救受創產業和廠商，但政府出資推出拯救政策將無效且形同浪費。

Good management is likely to be more effective than governments' aid，解除廠商危機的關鍵在於經營管理者如何提升"管理效率"，光靠政府救助根本無法解決面對之問題和危機。也就是廠商的經營管理者要自己負起責任，去發揮管理機制來提升自身的"管理效率"，進而使"機會成本"降低至最佳化，而使"生產力"和"成本效益"達到最佳化。既管理者要從下面的聯立方程式(或代式)找出最佳解，並"解行相應"，且有效地落實"執行力"：


Management=F(M,I,T)---------------1

B=Rev - C = P*Q - (C_f +C_V)--------2

New Vision and Meditation:
*舊思維的傳統管理方式(當今MBA的思維通則)：P、Q系受制於他人或大環境，經營管理者無能力即時加以有效調整P和Q，只能摸著鼻子英勇無比地調低自家C中的C_f+C_V，現在廠商實施大裁員、大幅減薪或強迫無薪休假等等就是舊思維的傳統管理者所能採用的管理方法(這種方式當然不叫做管理，而是管制或控制)；
*這波經濟大風暴主因是近10年來，在舊思維的傳統企業管理理念和方法驅使下，使大多數廠商的經營管理者追逐他人或外在環境給予的低成本C=C_f+C_V (我把它叫做"包二奶式"的生產線外移或取代，例如把生產線外移至中國，去享用別人給予而不是廠商自己做好經營管理所產生的低成本的生產要素)_。新世紀已經邁入第10年，廠商應該放棄舊思維的傳統經營管理方式，採用新的Green Economic management, 付予P和Q新的內涵和價值，C中要加入C_g，使C=F(C_f,C_V,C_g)，並採行Just-in-time的全面經營管理機制，且實施全面性的"品質管理"，品質 =F(品德，質量，Green)，以因應進入新世紀新價值觀前的摧枯拉朽、過化存神的大調整......產銷存(價格)供應鏈及社會價值鏈等等的斷鏈、大失調之衝擊與破壞。
20年前我的研究所碩士畢業論文，就已有相關於Green Economic Management 的深入論述，其中C_g的論證和實施更是精闢。

*在股市投資選標的，應該拋棄那些仍採舊思維的傳統企業經營管理理念和方法的公司之股票(，之前這些廠商的營收和獲利皆直接或間接來自美國、歐 洲及日本等的訂單恩賜，現在訂單流被斷流了，它們的營運和其對應的股票股價的窘困就原形畢露無遺，這些都是近年來，台灣自吹自擂的兩兆雙星系列產業及廠商)，去選擇投資已採用Green Economic Management的廠商或新產業的股票。


以下是"經濟學人"最近的一篇文章-----製造業的崩潰：

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The collapse of manufacturing

Feb 19th 2009

From The Economist print edition

The financial crisis has created an industrial crisis. What should governments do about it?
$0.00, not counting fuel and handling: that is the cheapest quote right now if you want to ship a container from southern China to Europe. Back in the summer of 2007 the shipper would have charged $1,400. Half-empty freighters are just one sign of a worldwide collapse in manufacturing. In Germany December’s machine-tool orders were 40% lower than a year earlier. Half of China’s 9,000 or so toy exporters have gone bust. Taiwan’s shipments of notebook computers fell by a third in the month of January. The number of cars being assembled in America was 60% below January 2008.
The destructive global power of the financial crisis became clear last year. The immensity of the manufacturing crisis is still sinking in, largely because it is seen in national terms—indeed, often nationalistic ones. In fact manufacturing is also caught up in a global whirlwind.
Industrial production fell in the latest three months by 3.6% and 4.4% respectively in America and Britain (equivalent to annual declines of 13.8% and 16.4%). Some locals blame that on Wall Street and the City. But the collapse is much worse in countries more dependent on manufacturing exports, which have come to rely on consumers in debtor countries. Germany’s industrial production in the fourth quarter fell by 6.8%; Taiwan’s by 21.7%; Japan’s by 12%—which helps to explain why GDP is falling even faster there than it did in the early 1990s (see article). Industrial production is volatile, but the world has not seen a contraction like this since the first oil shock in the 1970s—and even that was not so widespread. Industry is collapsing in eastern Europe, as it is in Brazil, Malaysia and Turkey. Thousands of factories in southern China are now abandoned. Their workers went home to the countryside for the new year in January. Millions never came back (see article).

Factories floored

Having bailed out the financial system, governments are now being called on to save industry, too. Next to scheming bankers, factory workers look positively deserving. Manufacturing is still a big employer and it tends to be a very visible one, concentrated in places like Detroit, Stuttgart and Guangzhou. The failure of a famous manufacturer like General Motors (GM) would be a severe blow to people’s faith in their own prospects when a lack of confidence is already dragging down the economy. So surely it is right to give industry special support?

Despite manufacturing’s woes, the answer is no. There are no painless choices, but industrial aid suffers from two big drawbacks. One is that government programmes, which are slow to design and amend, are too cumbersome to deal with the varied, constantly changing difficulties of the world’s manufacturing industries. Part of the problem has been a drying-up of trade finance. Nobody knows how long that will last. Another part has come as firms have run down their inventories (in China some of these were stockpiles amassed before the Beijing Olympics). The inventory effect should be temporary, but, again, nobody knows how big or lasting it will be.
The other drawback is that sectoral aid does not address the underlying cause of the crisis—a fall in demand, not just for manufactured goods, but for everything. Because there is too much capacity (far too much in the car industry), some businesses must close however much aid the government pumps in. How can governments know which firms to save or the “right” size of any industry? That is for consumers to decide. Giving money to the industries with the loudest voices and cleverest lobbyists would be unjust and wasteful. Shifting demand to the fortunate sector that has won aid from the unfortunate one that has not will only exacerbate the upheaval. One country’s preference for a given industry risks provoking a protectionist backlash abroad and will slow the long-run growth rate at home by locking up resources in inefficient firms.

Nothing to lose but their supply chains

Some say that manufacturing is special, because the rest of the economy depends on it. In fact, the economy is more like a network in which everything is connected to everything else, and in which every producer is also a consumer. The important distinction is not between manufacturing and services, but between productive and unproductive jobs.
Some manufacturers accept that, but proceed immediately to another argument: that the current crisis is needlessly endangering productive, highly skilled manufacturing jobs. Nowadays each link in the supply chain depends on all the others. Carmakers cite GM’s new Camaro, threatened after a firm that makes moulded-plastic parts went bankrupt. The car industry argues that the loss of GM itself would permanently wreck the North American supply chain (see article). Aid, they say, can save good firms to fight another day.
Although some supply chains have choke points, that is a weak general argument for sectoral aid. As a rule, suppliers with several customers, and customers with several suppliers, should be more resilient than if they were a dependent captive of a large group. The evidence from China is that today’s lack of demand creates the spare capacity that allows customers to find a new supplier quickly if theirs goes out of business. When that is hard, because a parts supplier is highly specialised, say, good management is likely to be more effective than state aid. The best firms monitor their vital suppliers closely and buy parts from more than one source, even if it costs money. In the extreme, firms can support vulnerable suppliers by helping them raise cash or by investing in them.
If sectoral aid is wasteful, why then save the banking system? Not for the sake of the bankers, certainly; nor because state aid will create an efficient financial industry. Even flawed bank rescues and stimulus plans, like the one Barack Obama signed into law this week, are aimed at the roots of the economy’s problems: saving the banks, no matter how undeserving they are, is supposed to keep finance flowing to all firms; fiscal stimulus is supposed to lift demand across the board. As manufacturing collapses, governments should not fiddle with sectoral plans. Their proper task is broader but no less urgent: to get on with spending and with freeing up finance.